What Should A Jew Do? by Gendin, Sidney
WHAT SHOULD A JEW DO? 
rthodox" is one of 
those words like 
"official" or "authority" 
meant to give weight to 
an otherwise lightweight concept. I heard an 
"authority" on the Civil War state that the 
"official" name for that war is "The War 
Between the States." I learned that he meant 
nothing more than that it was popularly so-
called by many historians.The "authority" 
looked with righteous contempt upon 
"laymen" who didn't know any better. 
We have a situation not unlike the above 
in the world of Judaic titles. In the 1800s a 
group of rabbis hit upon the very unfortunate 
idea of calling their new movement "Reform 
Judaism." A responding group of rabbis then 
adopted the title "Orthodox." Ever since, it 
has been an uphill battle for the "Reform" 
Jews. "Reform" Jews eagerly desire respect and 
recognition from their rivals. This respect and 
recognition has never occurred and never 
will. The typical "Orthodox" Jew regards the 
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"Reform" Jew with contempt, as a particular-
ly vile heretic not quite so fit to associate 
with as an admitted atheist. Even "humanis-
tic" Jews, those proud of their heritage but 
who do not practice the religion, suppose 
that "real" Jews are "Orthodox" and that 
there is something of the sham about 
"Reformism." (I speak knowledgeably as one 
raised in a blended community of the 
"Onhodox" and the "humanistic," the son of 
immigrant parents who spoke Yiddish almost 
exclusively; I knew no non-Jews, apart from 
my teachers, until I finished college and 
. entered graduate school.) Had those 19th 
century rabbis been shrewd enough to call 
their movement "Biblical Judaism," who can 
say for sure where the balance of prestige 
would lie today? 
. In the light of this background it is instruc-
tive to compare the reception Riehard 
Schwartz's book, Judaism and Vegetarianism, is 
bound to receive within the Jewish commu-
nity as a whole with the reception that will 
be accorded David Bleich's article, "Judaism 
and Animal Experimentation." Schwartz 
argues the case for vegetarianism for Jews. 
Bleich, despite the title of his article, defends 
a wide range of traditional exploitations of 
animals; experimentation gets almost 
insignificant coverage. Schwartz has a Ph.D. 
in civil engineering and is now a mathemat-
ics professor. He speaks to us from the 
"Reform" perspective. Bleich is a rabbi, a pro-
fessor of Talmudic Studies at Yeshiva Univer-
sity, a former Visiting Scholar at the Oxford 
Center for post-graduate Hebrew Studies, and 
a member of the Board of Directors of the 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations in 
America. In short, it is inevitable that 
Schwartz will have zero impact on the 
"Orthodox" and "Conservative" communi-
ties. ("Conservatism" is rather like a halfway 
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house between "Orthodox" and "Reform.") 
On the other hand, Bleich will surely rein-
force the views and practices of those com-
munities, and it is likely he will exert 
influence on "Reform" and "humanistic" Jews 
alike. "Reform" Jews battle a sense of inferior-
ity, a feeling they are not quite at the center 
of things, and are themselves inclined to 
thi~k,grudgingly, that it is the "Orthodox" 
rabbi who is the "true" scholar. As for the 
"humanistic" Jew, s/he knows there are. 
"Reform" rabbis who do not understand 
Hebrew and read only as much liturgical 
Hebrew as is necessary to conduct services. 
S/he may not change his/her practices after 
reading BleIch but s/he may well go away 
feeling that something s/he is doing is not 
st~ictly kosher. 
To provide background for my discussion of 
Bleich and Schwartz, I want first to take a 
peek at some history of Jewish thought. 
The Jewish Bible did not receive its final 
rabbinical ratification until sometime about 
90 C.E., and that canonization includes only 
such books of the Old Testament as were pro-
duced prior to 250 B.C.E. Among those 
books, some are holier than others. In particu-
lar, the holiest are the first five books, called 
the Pentateuch by Christians and the Torah 
. by Jews. In them one finds the details of 
Jewish law. The Torah is thought to be divine, 
written by Moses with his hand guided by 
God. But, as most of us know, the Torah is 
mainly a long narrative story, so that its rules 
and regulations tend to be concise and in 
need of interpretation. Accordingly, halakah 
(oral interpretation) is as old as the Torah 
itself. Sometime during the first century 
B.C.E., Torah "authorities" preached the doc-
trine that halakah was the "Oral" Torah, not 
just interpretation. Henceforth the first five 
books of the Old Testament were reduced to 
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the "Written" Torah. The standard ploy of the 
early "sages" was that the "Written" Torah 
existed for the sake of the "Oral" Torah. In 
other words, the "Oral" Torah actually 
superceded the "Written" Bible in impor-
tance! Not surprisingly, almost immediately 
some people denied the divine status of the 
"Oral" Torah. Rabbi Akiva, the greatest 
"sage" of the time, used a tactic later to 
become common in the Christian hierarchy: 
he frightened these heretics by declaring that 
they would be excluded from the world-to-
come. Akiva and other "authorities" 
announced that only those who studied the 
Torah full time were able to say whether the 
"Oral" Torah was divine. (About one thou-
sand or so years later, Pope Innocent III 
forbade "laymen" from reading the Bible.) 
Although the "sages" were confident that 
the tens of thousands of words comprising 
the "Oral" Torah had been faithfully passed 
down through the centuries without error, 
the practice of writing it down began during 
the era in which Akiva flourished. This 
written version of oral doctrine became 
known as the Mishnah and there were prob-
ably many versions of it. It was finally com-
pleted in the canonized version we know 
today by Judah-ha-Nasi somewhere around 
200 C.E. Thereafter the Mishnah, not the 
"Written" Torah became the central concern 
of scholars. 
For several centuries two principal centers 
of study each produced a Talmud - detailed 
commentaries on the Mishnah. In time the 
Babylonian center achieved, for reasons that 
needn't concern us, ascendancy over the 
Jerusalem center. Today, when Jews refer to 
"the" Talmud, it is that immense Babylonian 
work completed about 600 C.E. and running 
to two and a half million words that they 
have in mind. The Talmud, unlike the 
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Mishnah, is a scholarly work in which the 
Talmudic "sages" proved their points about 
Jewish law by citing passages in the Mishnah 
and often, too, in the "Written" Bible. 
Mishnah "sages" did not routinely quote bibli-
cal sources to prove a point. Indeed, what 
could have been the point of doing so? After 
all, the "Written" Torah was written for the 
sake of the "Oral" Torah. Despite the more 
humble approach of the Talmudists, in time 
the Talmud itself came to be regarded with 
the same reverence as the Mishnah. The 12th 
century "sage" Rashi declared that the study 
of the Talmud was more important than the 
study of the Torah. Even before Rashi the 
Talmud had become the chief object of study 
in the "post-Talmud rabbinic period" and it 
remains so to this day. 
Although prior to the 19th century there 
had been Jewish sects (for example, Chas-
sidism), the first serious challenge to rabbinic 
authority occurred in that century. In 1885 
the leaders of the so-called "Reform" move-
ment gathered in Pittsburgh and produced 
what has become known as the "Pittsburgh 
Platform." The following excerpt highlights a 
few interesting aspects of "Reform": 
We hold that all such Mosaic and rab-
binicallaws as regulate diet ... originated 
in ages and under the influence of ideas 
entirely foreign to our present mental 
and spiritual state ... We consider our-
selves no longer a nation but a religious 
community and therefore expect neither 
a return to Palestine nor the restoration 
of any of the laws concerning the Jewish 
state. [My emphasis.] 
This passage is bold and daring, but the 
philosophy behind it need not have been 
expressed so provocatively. The Pittsburgh 
Platform could have emphasized the fact that 
the Torah teaches us moral principles, instead 
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of rigid rules.! Principles are not all-or-nothing 
rules like a traffic law that forbids any vehicle 
from travelling 30 miles per hour in a certain 
zone. With such rules either you are violating 
them or you are not. Instead, principles are 
factors to be weighed in decision-making. The 
Constitution, for example, is not a simple 
book of recipes laying down a code of conduct 
with precise instructions from which one 
never deviates. A principle outlawing "unrea-
scmable searches" always puts a premium on 
intelligent deliberation: what is unreasonable 
at one time or place may be reasonable at 
another time or place. 
The Pittsburgh Platform might have 
emphasized the fact that the Bible lays down 
principles of behavior that deserve to be 
abided by throughout all ages but, since intel-
ligence is also never outdated, must be applied 
differentially in each epoch. It should have 
made clearer than it did that the circum-
stances of moral deliberation inevitably 
change and that much of what the Torah is 
concerned with were conditions peculiar to its 
time of composition. In fact, even the "Ortho-
dox" make allowances for changing times. 
Here is an example. Traditionally, Jews tore a 
piece of their apparel at a funeral as a sign of 
respect for the dead. Today, "Orthodox" Jews 
pin a bit of ribbon to their clothes and then 
snip it with scissors. What do they take them-
selves to be doing? They ought to say that the 
symbolic meaning of the gesture remains 
intact. Really to tear one's clothes today is a 
sacrifice far and away greater than it was 2500 
years ago. As we say today, "It's the gesture 
that counts." Instead, "Orthodox" Jews take 
themselves to be literally following a rule. In 
my view, this makes a mockery of the custom 
and does not respect it. It amounts to cheat-
ing. "Reform" Jews have pretty much aban-
doned the practice altogether and find other 
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ways to obey the principle commanding that 
the dead be shown respect. 
In 1984 a group of distinguished representa-
tives of the world's major religions gathered in 
London for three days to discuss the use of 
animals in science from each of their particu-
lar religion's point of view. Among the invi-
tees was Rabbi David Bleich. His presentation 
has now been published in the aforementioned 
book edited by Tom Regan. The article does 
not concern itself especially with animal 
experimentation. It ranges over all aspects of 
the treatment of animals, including the 
slaughter of animals for food. Bleich discusses 
each aspect with respect to tza'ar ha'alei 
hayyim - the pain of living creatures. Bleich's 
view is that Judaism is committed to reducing 
the pain of living creatures wherever this is 
feasible. The catch, obviously, is in determin-
ing when it is feasible. Bleich's method is to 
provide a scholarly survey of what various 
"sages" or "authorities" have had to say. He 
never writes that So and So argues for this and 
that but always says "In the opinion of this 
great sage," etc. In the course of his thirty page 
essay Bleich uses this expression, or some 
variant of it, at least twenty-two times that I 
noticed. 
Bleich's summary view is that "In alllikeli-
hood, the rationale governing the strictures 
against tza'ar ha'alei hayyim is concern for the 
moral welfare of the human agent rather than 
concern for the physical welfare of the 
animals... " He "argues" for the reasonableness 
of this view by showing that it is shared by 
"many early authorities." Bleich doesn't 
mention it, but his view happens also to be the 
standard Kantian view. Kant's view has been 
subjected to extensive and rigorous criticism 
and found to be logically wanting,2 The unar-
gued for ground of Bleich's position is this: 
doing x may be perfectly decent considered by 
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itself, but it may cause depraved attitudes in 
one who does it, and this depraved attitude 
will cause him to do things that are wrong. 
Now, of course this may sometimes be true, but 
in general there is no reason to think that 
practices unobjectionable in themselves will 
slide slipperily down a slope and result in evil 
character. Undoubtedly, none of the "sages" 
did the empirical research necessary to estab-
lish that hurting animals leads, say, to hurting 
children. Much more importantly, it is as plain 
as anything can be that hurting animals is bad 
in itself, and it is troubling to observe that 
there are "sages" unable to grasp that fact. 
Among the celebrated "authorities" Bleich 
relies upon is Maimonides, who wrote that 
"The reason for the prohibition against eating 
a limb of a living animal is because this would 
make one acquire the habit of cruelty." Mai-
monides appears to think either that a cruel 
act is not bad unless it leads to the habit of 
cruelty or else that a cruel habit isn't bad 
unless it is practiced on humans. Why individ-
ual acts of cruelty are not bad unless habitual 
is a doctrine far too subtle for me. If Mai-
monides means the second possibility, i.e., that 
it is only cruelty habitually practiced on 
humans that is bad, then I leave the reader to 
decide if one can believe such a doctrine and 
be a "sage." 
Bleich contentedly quotes Maimonides 
again when the latter writes, "Now since the 
necessity to have good food requires that 
animals be killed ..." For thousands of years 
before Maimonides lived, and during his own 
age as well, there were vegetarians, a great 
many of whom lived as healthily as the omni-
vores and without any sense that they were 
undergoing any noble deprivation. Mai-
monides knew this as well as anyone did. Why 
then did he write the above? Well, why does 
anyone write such things? I personally know 
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intelligent professional philosophers who also 
say that to have good food one must kill 
animals. They know, as well as any reader of 
this journal does, that there are life-long vege-
tarians who are now in their nineties. It is a 
matter of not taking animals seriously enough 
to bother with accuracy. People swear alle-
giance to the maxim "Thou shalt not kill" who 
regularly slaughter animals. It is not a matter of 
thinking that the maxim does not apply to 
animals. It is a matter of not thinking. 
Animals are simply not thought important 
enough to pause over the question, "Does the 
maxim apply to them?" I have no particular 
axe to grind about the question. Suffice it to 
say that not a single one of Bleich's "sages" or 
"authorities" confronts the question, "Must we 
eat animals to live well?," and consequently 
none has a single illuminating or even stupid 
thing to say about it. Bleich never pauses to 
raise the question, "Would it be wrong for a 
Jew to be a vegetarian?" 
Bleich says that according to Jewish law 
meat may be consumed only if the animal has 
been slaughtered in conformity with a pre-
scribed ritual. This is false. Most animals 
"Orthodox" Jews eat are not slaughtered in 
accordance with any ritual. Steve Sapontzis 
has estimated that humans kill many trillions 
of animals each year. All the farm animals 
slaughtered and all the wild animals trapped 
and hunted plus all the animals killed via 
vivisection together are but a small fraction 
of the number of animals people kill each 
year. "Official" estimates don't approach this 
estimate simply because the vast majority of 
animals we kill (fish and invertebrates) don't 
even deserve to be counted, much less 
deserve to be worried about. Bleich's remark 
reveals only his disdain for fish. He has no 
reason to think they cannot suffer. He simply 
doesn't think about them at all. 
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Bleich holds that killing animals does not 
necessarily involve a form of tza'ar 00'alei 
hayyim and so isn't wrong per se. Do not 
suppose that this is because killing needn't 
be painful. Naturally, Bleich does not appeal 
to the Torah for this but, rather, trots out a 
long list of sayings by "sages" who agree with 
him; for example, Ri Migash proclaims that 
killing animals for human food is not tza'ar 
00'alei hayyim but killing them for dog food 
is. Bleich's final view is that pain may be 
inflicted on animals without violating the 
constraint on pain if the pain serves some 
"legitimate human purpose." What makes his 
view bizarre is his conception of what a legit-
imate purpose is. Quoting the Shulan Arukh 
(a codification of laws first printed in 1565, 
the following of which is regarded by the 
faithful as the "true" test of "orthodoxy"), 
Bleich says it is permissible to pluck the 
feathers of fowl before slaughter. Shulan 
Arukh concedes the practice is cruel but the 
overriding legitimate purpose is having quills 
for writing. Bleich invokes Talmudic 
"authorities" to maintain that at the funeral 
rites of a monarch it is permitted to sever the 
tendons of the horse on which the king rode 
as a way of bestowing honor on kings and 
princes. Bleich is not in the habit of raising 
an eyebrow and asking whether that is a 
legitimate purpose. Bleich approvingly 
quotes yet another "authority" who says a 
chicken's toe may be cut off to render it unfit 
for pagan sacrifice. He points out that the 
"majority of rabbinic authorities" cite finan-
cial gain as a legitimate benefit that may be 
pursued at the expense of tza'ar ba'alei 
hayyim. Just about anything and everything 
ends up being permitted. All biomedical 
experiments, with anesthesia if appropriate 
{and by implication, without anesthesia if 
necessary} are fine with Bleich. Routine tox-
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icity testing, breaking the wings of birds so 
that they cannot flyaway, and just about 
anything else you can think of turns out to 
be an exception to the proscription against 
inflicting pain on animals. Everything is 
proved by appeal to some rabbinic "authori-
ty" or other. Never once does Bleich grant 
himself the license to ask, "Granted that 
such and such practice is permitted, is it 
required? Can we live reasonably happy lives 
without sacrificing the animal? True, if we 
kill the cow we must slit its throat in a 
certain way, but would it be a terrible thing if 
we ate a tomato instead?" Bleich's article is a 
dutiful exposition of what greater men than 
he have thought and said. He knows they are 
greater, because they lived long ago. Not a 
single one of his "authorities" lived in the 
last two hundred years. I am reminded of the 
aphorism that a statesman is a politician who 
has been dead a long time. 
Jim Harrer, Animals: /4/9 
Copyright.Free IUustralions. 
New York: Dover, 1979 
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Schwartz's book is a refreshing contrast. His 
basic claim, made in the first two chapters, is 
that Jews ought to be vegetarians. The book 
contains much else besides. There are chapters 
on the health benefits of a vegetarian diet and 
on the advantages of vegetarianism for feeding 
the hungry of the world. Another chapter 
develops a connection between the peace 
movement and vegetarianism and there is one 
giving interesting biographies of famous Jewish 
vegetarians. Another chapter, donated by 
Shoshana Margolin, presents vegetarian 
recipes. 
Schwartz understands that the world 
changes, and among those changes has been 
the introduction of intensive factory farming. 
Our economy is no longer agrarian, and 
because billions of people live today and the 
numbers will keep growing, there can be no 
retreat to the yesteryears of placid family 
farming. Inevitably, however they may be 
slaughtered, farm animals live miserable lives. 
Anyone who partakes of a flesh diet is bound 
to be violating the proscription against tza'aT 
ba'a1ei hayyim. 
Schwartz quotes biblical passages to prove 
that compassion for animals is a direct moral 
requirement and does not derive from any 
worry that if we are cruel to them we will learn 
to be cruel to ourselves. All this is praisewor-
thy. Unfortunately, Schwartz tries to prove too 
much. He seems to think that vegetarianism is 
not only permitted by the Bible and required 
by contemporary realities; he thinks vegetari-
anism is strictly required by rigid rules of 
Judaism. His arguments and quotations are 
unconvincing. On the very first page of his 
book he quotes the passage in Genesis that 
reads, "Behold, I have given you every herb 
yielding seed which is upon the face of the 
earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a 
tree yielding seed - to you it shall be for 
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food." Schwartz takes this to state a dietary 
law. It seems to be no such thing. Nothing in 
that passage implies or suggests that animals 
may not be eaten. Schwartz also thinks the 
passage, "And to every beast of the earth I 
have given every green herb for food" is a 
dietary law for animals. It is preposterous to 
think animals who eat animals are sinners. 
Later, according to Schwartz, God permitted 
people to eat animals, since they were a bunch 
of weak-willed wretches anyway. Later, again, 
God actually provided meat, in the form of 
quails, and when they ate the quails that put 
him in a fury. Now none of this seems 
attributable to a being worthy of being called 
"God." If we take our cue as to what to eat 
from God, let him act the part. Schwartz is 
much better when he is arguing, as Bleich 
never does, that it is a good thing not to eat 
animals, permitted or not. These arguments are 
developed mainly in the chapters on feeding 
the hungry and on the healthfulness of a vege-
tarian diet. 
Sometimes Schwartz makes the mistake of 
appealing to the Talmud, "sages" and contem-
porary "authorities." He gets little mileage out 
of any of this. He makes the nearly calamitous 
mistake of citing a passage in the Talmud that 
reads, "Only one who studies Torah may eat 
meat, but one who does not study Torah is for-
bidden to eat meat." This is almost self-defeat-
ing. Schwartz wants to use the quotation to 
claim that very few Jews today are scholarly 
enough to justify their eating meat. But of 
course he should limit himself to arguments 
that say no one is entitled to eat meat, because 
that is what he actually believes. He should not 
appeal to "authorities" that have set them-
selves up as a class of privileged exceptions. 
Schwartz says that Talmud "authorities" strong-
ly disapprove of hunting, but of what signifi-
cance is that? The essence of "Reform" 
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Judaism is its acceptance of progressive Tevela~ followed by the kosher slaughtering ritual. 
don according to which each Jew thinks for Schwartz's book is not the scholarly tract 
her/himself and makes her/his own discoveries that Bleich's article is and, in any case, as I 
as to what the Torah requires. Thus, the Tal~ said at the outset, cannot hope to influence 
mudic "authorities" either had reasons for dis- Jews in large numbers. But his book is read~ 
approving of hunting, or they didn't. If they able, chock full of interesting stories and 
had, it is the reasons that have authority, and recipes. "Reform" Jews will enjoy it; "Ortho~ 
we should be told what those reasons are so we dox" Jews won't go near it with a ten foot pole. 
may reflect on them. If they had no reasons, 
then their views are arbitrary and carry no 
weight. Near the end of his second chapter 
Schwartz makes the curious remark that 1 I owe the distinction between principles and 
Jewish slaughtering is the most humane form rules to the philosopher. lawyer, Ronald Dworkin. 
of slaughtering. I am unclear why he makes 2 Although the critiques of Kant (and hence 
against Bleich) occur in very many places, the readerthis "observation." Apart from the fact that 
need only consult the clear and cogent discussion in the remark is counterproductive tactically, it 
Tom Regan's The Case far Animal Rights (Berkeley:has the minor vice of being patently false. The University of California Press, 1983). 
slaughter might be made more humane in I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Scott 
many ways, e.g., administering an oral tran~ Hoogerhyde, for many illuminating discussions on 
quilizer, followed by stunning, and only then most of the points made in this paper. 
Now 60 pages! 
Not only the best writing on ethics and animals, 
but fiction, poetry, and autobiography 
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"Ber.vee-a the Species is a must for anyone 
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